Ets revisão do sistema de negociação

Revisão do Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE.

Uma revisão da literatura por consultores imperiais que analisa a eficácia do ETS da UE na condução da redução industrial. Este …

Uma revisão de evidências do Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE, centrada na eficácia do sistema na condução da redução industrial.

Ref: 12/264 PDF, 1.86MB, 70 páginas.

Este arquivo pode não ser adequado para usuários de tecnologia assistiva. Solicite um formato acessível.

Se você usa tecnologia assistiva (como um leitor de tela) e precisa de uma versão deste documento em um formato mais acessível, envie um email para correspondence@decc. gsi. gov. uk. Diga-nos o formato que você precisa. Isso nos ajudará se você disser a tecnologia que você usa.

Uma revisão da literatura por consultores imperiais que analisa evidências sobre a eficácia do RCLE da UE na condução da redução industrial. Esta revisão considera amplamente a evidência de se o ETS da UE tem impulsionado a redução, quais os elementos do ETS da UE que impulsionam a redução e a forma como o EU ETS interage com outras políticas. O relatório também identifica lacunas de evidências e sugere algumas orientações para futuras pesquisas.

Conteúdo Relacionado.

Publicado por.

Ajude-nos a melhorar GOV. UK.

Serviços e informações.

Departamentos e políticas.

Suporte links.

Ajuda Cookies Contato Termos e condições Rhestr o Wasanaethau Cymraeg Construído pelo Serviço Digital do Governo.

Todo o conteúdo está disponível sob a Open Government License v3.0, exceto quando indicado de outra forma.

O Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE (EU ETS)

O Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE explicou.

O sistema de comércio de emissões da UE (EU ETS) é uma pedra angular da política da UE para combater as alterações climáticas e a sua ferramenta chave para reduzir as emissões de gases com efeito de estufa de forma rentável. É o primeiro mercado de carbono do mundo e continua sendo o maior.

opera em 31 países (todos os 28 países da UE, mais a Islândia, o Liechtenstein e a Noruega) limita as emissões de mais de 11 mil instalações de energia pesada (centrais eléctricas e instalações industriais) e as companhias aéreas que operam entre esses países cobre cerca de 45% dos gases de efeito estufa da UE emissões.

Para uma visão geral detalhada, veja:

Um sistema "cap and trade".

O EU ETS trabalha no princípio do "capital e do comércio".

Um limite é fixado na quantidade total de certos gases de efeito estufa que podem ser emitidos por instalações cobertas pelo sistema. A tampa é reduzida ao longo do tempo para que as emissões totais caírem.

Dentro do limite, as empresas recebem ou compram licenças de emissão que podem trocar entre si, conforme necessário. Eles também podem comprar quantidades limitadas de créditos internacionais de projetos de poupança de emissões em todo o mundo. O limite do número total de permissões disponíveis garante que eles tenham um valor.

Depois de cada ano, uma empresa deve entregar subsídios suficientes para cobrir todas as suas emissões, caso contrário multas pesadas são impostas. Se uma empresa reduz suas emissões, ela pode manter os subsídios de reposição para cobrir suas necessidades futuras, ou então vendê-las para outra empresa que não possui subsídios.

O comércio traz flexibilidade que garante que as emissões sejam reduzidas, quando menos custa. Um preço robusto do carbono também promove o investimento em tecnologias limpas e com baixas emissões de carbono.

Principais características da fase 3 (2018-2020)

O EU ETS está agora em sua terceira fase - significativamente diferente das fases 1 e 2.

As principais mudanças são:

Um único limite de emissões a nível da UE aplica-se ao sistema anterior de capitais nacionais. O leilão é o método padrão para a alocação de licenças (em vez da alocação gratuita), e as regras de alocação harmonizadas se aplicam às licenças ainda concedidas gratuitamente. Mais setores e Os gases incluíram 300 milhões de licenças reservadas na Reserva dos Novos Participantes para financiar a implantação de tecnologias inovadoras de energia renovável e captura e armazenamento de carbono através do programa NER 300.

Sectores e gases abrangidos.

O sistema abrange os seguintes setores e gases com foco em emissões que podem ser medidas, reportadas e verificadas com um alto nível de precisão:

dióxido de carbono (CO 2) da geração de energia e geração de energia setores industriais intensivos em energia, incluindo refinarias de petróleo, siderúrgicas e produção de ferro, alumínio, metais, cimento, lima, vidro, cerâmica, celulose, papel, papelão, ácidos e produtos químicos orgânicos a granel Óxido de nitrogênio da aviação comercial (N 2 O) a partir da produção de ácidos nítrico, adípico e glioxílico e perfluorocarbonos de glioxal (PFCs) da produção de alumínio.

A participação no ETS da UE é obrigatória para as empresas desses sectores, mas.

Em alguns sectores, apenas as instalações acima de um certo tamanho estão incluídas, certas pequenas instalações podem ser excluídas se os governos implementarem medidas fiscais ou outras que reduzam suas emissões por um montante equivalente no setor de aviação, até 2018 o ETS da UE se aplica apenas aos vôos entre aeroportos localizados no Espaço Económico Europeu (EEE).

Fornecer reduções de emissões.

O ETS da UE provou que colocar um preço sobre o carbono e negociá-lo pode funcionar. As emissões das instalações no esquema estão caindo como previsto - em cerca de 5% em relação ao início da fase 3 (2018) (ver figuras de 2018).

Em 2020, as emissões dos setores abrangidos pelo sistema serão 21% menores do que em 2005.

Desenvolvendo o mercado do carbono.

Criado em 2005, o EU ETS é o primeiro e maior sistema internacional de comércio de emissões do mundo, representando mais de três quartos do comércio internacional de carbono.

O ETS da UE também está inspirando o desenvolvimento do comércio de emissões em outros países e regiões. A UE pretende ligar o EU ETS a outros sistemas compatíveis.

A legislação principal do EU ETS.

30/04/2018 - Versão consolidada da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho 23/04/2009 - Directiva 2009/29 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE de modo a melhorar e alargar o regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa da Comunidade 19/11/2008 - Directiva 2008/101 / CE do Conselho o Parlamento Europeu e o Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE, de modo a incluir actividades de aviação no âmbito do regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade 27/10/2004 - Directiva 2004/101 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do O Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade, no que diz respeito aos mecanismos de projecto do Protocolo de Quioto 13/10/2003 - Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho ncil que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho.

Relatórios do mercado de carbono.

23/11/2017 - COM (2017) 693 - Relatório sobre o funcionamento do mercado europeu do carbono 01/02/2017 - COM (2017) 48 - Relatório sobre o funcionamento do mercado europeu do carbono 18/11/2018 - COM 2018) 576 - Relatório sobre o funcionamento do mercado europeu do carbono 14/11/2018 - COM (2018) 652 - O estado do mercado europeu do carbono em 2018.

Revisão do RCLE da UE para a fase 3.

04/02/2018 - Conclusões do Conselho Europeu de 4 de fevereiro de 2018 (ver conclusões 23 e 24) 18/03/2018 - Orientações sobre a interpretação do Anexo I da Diretiva EET da UE (exceto atividades de aviação) 18/03/2018 - Orientação documento para identificar geradores de eletricidade 06/04/2009 - Comunicado de imprensa do Conselho sobre a adoção do pacote de clima e energia 12/12/2008 - Conclusões da Presidência do Conselho Europeu (11 e 12 de dezembro de 2008) 12/12/2008 - Conselho Europeu Declaração sobre a utilização das receitas de leilões 23/01/2008 - Proposta de directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE, a fim de melhorar e alargar o sistema de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa da Comunidade 23 / 01/2008 - Documento de trabalho dos serviços da Comissão - Documento de acompanhamento da Proposta de directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE, a fim de melhorar e alargar o sistema de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa da UE - Avaliação de impacto.

Implementação.

04/07/2018 - Projecto de regulamento alterado sobre a determinação dos direitos creditórios internacionais 05/06/2018 - Projecto de regulamento relativo à determinação dos direitos creditórios internacionais 05/05/2018 Regulamento (UE) n. º 389/2018 da Comissão, de 2 de Maio de 2018, que estabelece um cadastro da União nos termos do da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, decisões n. ° 280/2004 / CE e 406/2009 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e que revoga os Regulamentos (UE) n. ° 920/2018 da Comissão e N. º 1193/2018 Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE 18/11/2018 - Regulamento da Comissão que estabelece um Registo da União para o período de negociação com início em 1 de Janeiro de 2018 e períodos de negociação subsequentes do regime de comércio de emissões da União nos termos da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do o Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e a Decisão 280/2004 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e que altera os Regulamentos (CE) n. º 2216/2004 e (UE) n. º 920/2018 - ainda não publicado no Jornal Oficial 07 / 10/2018 - Regulamento da Comissão (UE) n. º 920/2018 para um sistema de registos normalizado e seguro, nos termos da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e da Decisão n. º 280/2004 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho - versão não incluindo as alterações introduzidas pelo Regulamento de 18 de Novembro de 2018 08/10/2008 - Regulamento (CE) n. º 994/2008 da Comissão para um sistema de registos normalizado e seguro, nos termos da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e Decisão no 280/2004 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho - versão aplicável até 31 de Dezembro de 2018 26/10/2007 - Decisão do Comité Misto do EEE n. ° 146/2007 que liga o RCLE UE à Noruega, à Islândia e ao Liechtenstein 13/11 / 2006 - Decisão 2006/780 / CE da Comissão relativa à prevenção da contenção dupla de reduções das emissões de gases com efeito de estufa no âmbito do regime comunitário de comércio de licenças de emissão para as actividades de projectos no âmbito do Protocolo de Quioto nos termos da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho (n documentado no documento C (2006) 5362) 21/12/2004 - Versão consolidada do Regulamento (CE) n. º 2216/2004 da Comissão relativa a um sistema de registos normalizado e seguro, alterado pelo Regulamento (CE) n. º 916/2007 da Comissão, de 31 de Julho 2007, Regulamento (CE) n. º 994/2008 da Comissão, de 8 de Outubro de 2008, e Regulamento (UE) n. º 920/2018 da Comissão, de 7 de Outubro de 2018 - versão não incluída alterações introduzidas pelo Regulamento de 18 de Novembro de 2018.

Aplicação do IVA.

História legislativa da Directiva 2003/87 / CE.

Trabalho anterior à proposta da Comissão.

08/02/2000 - COM (2000) 87 - Livro Verde sobre o comércio de emissões de gases com efeito de estufa na União Europeia Mandato e resultados do Grupo de Trabalho 1 do ECCP: Mecanismos flexíveis 04/09/2001 - Resumo do Presidente da reunião da consulta das partes interessadas (com Indústria e ONGs ambientais) 19/05/1999 - COM (1999) 230 - Preparação para a implementação do Protocolo de Quioto 03/06/1998 - COM (1998) 353 - Alterações climáticas - Rumo a uma estratégia pós-Quioto da UE Âmbito do ETS da UE : 07/2007 - Instalações pequenas no sistema de comércio de licenças de emissão da UE 10/2006 - Inclusão de atividades e gases adicionais no sistema de comércio de licenças da UE Mais harmonização e maior previsibilidade: 12/2006 - A abordagem para novos operadores e fechamentos 10/2006 - Leilão das licenças de emissão de CO2 no RCLE-UE 10/2006 - Harmonização das metodologias de atribuição 12/2006 - Relatório sobre a competitividade internacional Grupo de trabalho do ECCP sobre o comércio de emissões sobre a revisão do RCLE da UE 15/06/2007 - Relatório final do 4º mee sobre a ligação com os sistemas de comércio de emissões em países terceiros 22/05/2007 - Relatório final da 3ª reunião sobre mais harmonização e previsibilidade aumentada 26/04/2007 - Relatório final da 2ª reunião sobre conformidade robusta e execução 09/03/2007 - Relatório final da 1ª reunião sobre o alcance da directiva.

Proposta da Comissão de outubro de 2001.

22/01/2002 - Documento não oficial sobre sinergias entre a proposta de comércio de emissões da CE (COM (2001) 581) e a Directiva IPPC 23/10/2001 - COM (2001) 581 - Proposta de directiva-quadro relativa ao comércio de emissões de gases com efeito de estufa dentro da Comunidade Europeia.

Reação da Comissão à leitura da proposta no Conselho e no Parlamento (incluindo a posição comum do Conselho)

18/07/2003 - COM (2003) 463 - Parecer da Comissão sobre as alterações do Parlamento Europeu à posição comum do Conselho respeitante à proposta de directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho 20/06/2003 - COM (2003) 364 - Comunicação da Comissão ao Parlamento Europeu relativa à posição comum do Conselho sobre a adopção de uma directiva que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho 18/03/2003 - Posição comum (CE ) N. º 28/2003 - Posição comum do Conselho sobre a adopção de uma directiva que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho 27/11/2002 - COM (2002) 680 - Proposta alterada para uma directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho Faq.

Abra todas as perguntas.

Perguntas e Respostas sobre o Sistema de Comércio de Emissões revisado (dezembro de 2008)

Qual é o objetivo do comércio de emissões?

O objectivo do Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE (EU ETS) é ajudar os Estados-Membros da UE a cumprir os seus compromissos de limitar ou reduzir as emissões de gases com efeito de estufa de forma rentável. Permitir que as empresas participantes compram ou vendam permissões de emissão significa que os cortes de emissão podem ser alcançados ao menos custo.

O RCLE da UE é a pedra angular da estratégia da UE para lutar contra as alterações climáticas. É o primeiro sistema de comércio internacional de emissões de CO 2 no mundo e está em operação desde 2005. A partir de janeiro de 2008, aplica-se não apenas aos 27 Estados-Membros da UE, mas também aos outros três membros da Área Econômica Européia - Noruega, Islândia e Liechtenstein. Atualmente, abrange mais de 10.000 instalações nos setores de energia e industrial, que são coletivamente responsáveis ​​por cerca de metade das emissões de CO 2 da UE e 40% de suas emissões totais de gases de efeito estufa. Uma alteração à Directiva ETS da UE, acordada em Julho de 2008, trará o sector da aviação para o sistema a partir de 2018.

Como funciona o comércio de emissões?

O ETS da UE é um sistema de "capitalização e comércio", ou seja, indica que ele limita o nível geral de emissões permitido, mas, dentro desse limite, permite que os participantes no sistema compram e vendam as licenças conforme exigirem. Essas provisões são a "moeda" comercial comum no coração do sistema. Um subsídio dá ao titular o direito de emitir uma tonelada de CO 2 ou a quantidade equivalente de outro gás com efeito de estufa. O limite do número total de licenças cria escassez no mercado.

No primeiro e segundo período de negociação ao abrigo do regime, os Estados-Membros tiveram de elaborar planos nacionais de atribuição (NAPs) que determinassem o seu nível total de emissões de ETS e quantos subsídios de emissão cada instalação em seu país recebe. No final de cada ano, as instalações devem render subsídios equivalentes às suas emissões. As empresas que mantêm suas emissões abaixo do nível de suas licenças podem vender seus excedentes de licenças. Aqueles que enfrentam dificuldade em manter suas emissões de acordo com suas licenças têm a opção de tomar medidas para reduzir suas próprias emissões - como investir em tecnologia mais eficiente ou usar fontes de energia menos intensivas em carbono - ou comprar os subsídios extras que precisam no mercado , Ou uma combinação de ambos. Essas escolhas provavelmente serão determinadas por custos relativos. Desta forma, as emissões são reduzidas sempre que é mais rentável fazê-lo.

Há quanto tempo o EU ETS está operando?

O ETS da UE foi lançado em 1 de Janeiro de 2005. O primeiro período de negociação foi de três anos até o final de 2007 e foi uma fase de "aprendizagem por fazer" para se preparar para o segundo período de negociação crucial. O segundo período de negociação começou em 1 de Janeiro de 2008 e é executado por cinco anos até o final de 2018. A importância do segundo período de negociação decorre do facto de coincidir com o primeiro período de compromisso do Protocolo de Quioto, durante o qual a UE e outros os países industrializados devem atingir seus objetivos para limitar ou reduzir as emissões de gases de efeito estufa. Para o segundo período comercial, as emissões do ETS da UE limitaram-se a cerca de 6,5% abaixo dos níveis de 2005, a fim de garantir que a UE como um todo e os Estados-Membros individualmente cumprem os compromissos de Quioto.

Quais são as principais lições aprendidas com a experiência até agora?

O EU ETS colocou um preço sobre o carbono e provou que o comércio de emissões de gases de efeito estufa funciona. O primeiro período comercial estabeleceu com sucesso a livre negociação de licenças de emissão em toda a UE, implementou a infra-estrutura necessária e desenvolveu um mercado de carbono dinâmico. O benefício ambiental da primeira fase pode ser limitado devido à alocação excessiva de subsídios em alguns Estados-Membros e em alguns setores, devido principalmente à dependência das projeções de emissões antes que os dados de emissão verificados estejam disponíveis no âmbito do RCLE da UE. Quando a publicação de dados de emissões verificadas para 2005 destacou essa "sobreavaliação", o mercado reagiu como seria esperado pela redução do preço de mercado das licenças. A disponibilidade de dados de emissões verificadas permitiu à Comissão garantir que o limite das dotações nacionais na segunda fase se estabeleça em um nível que resulte em reduções reais de emissões.

Além de sublinhar a necessidade de dados verificados, a experiência até agora demonstrou que uma maior harmonização dentro do RCLE da UE é imperativa para garantir que a UE alcance os seus objetivos de redução de emissões pelo menos com custos e com distorções competitivas mínimas. A necessidade de mais harmonização é mais clara em relação à forma como o limite das licenças de emissão globais é definido.

Os dois primeiros períodos de negociação também mostram que métodos nacionais amplamente diferentes para alocação de licenças para instalações ameaçam uma concorrência leal no mercado interno. Além disso, é necessária uma maior harmonização, esclarecimento e aperfeiçoamento no que se refere ao alcance do sistema, ao acesso a créditos de projetos de redução de emissões fora da UE, as condições para vincular o ETS da UE aos sistemas de comércio de emissões em outros lugares e o monitoramento, verificação e requisitos de relatórios.

Quais são as principais alterações ao ETS da UE e a partir de quando serão aplicadas?

As alterações de design acordadas serão aplicadas a partir do terceiro período de negociação, ou seja, janeiro de 2018. Enquanto os trabalhos preparatórios serão iniciados imediatamente, as regras aplicáveis ​​não mudarão até janeiro de 2018 para garantir a manutenção da estabilidade regulatória.

O EU ETS no terceiro período será um sistema mais eficiente, mais harmonizado e mais justo.

O aumento da eficiência é alcançado por meio de um período de negociação mais longo (8 anos em vez de 5 anos), um limite de emissões robusto e anualmente decrescente (redução de 21% em 2020 em relação a 2005) e um aumento substancial da quantidade de leilão (de menos de 4% na fase 2 para mais da metade na fase 3).

Mais uma harmonização foi acordada em muitas áreas, inclusive no que se refere à definição de limite (um limite da UE em vez dos limites nacionais nas fases 1 e 2) e as regras para a alocação livre de transição.

A equidade do sistema foi substancialmente aumentada pela mudança para as regras de atribuição gratuita da UE para as instalações industriais e pela introdução de um mecanismo de redistribuição que permite aos novos Estados-Membros licitar mais subsídios.

Como o texto final se compara à proposta inicial da Comissão?

Os objectivos de clima e energia acordados pelo Conselho Europeu da Primavera de 2007 foram mantidos e a arquitectura geral da proposta da Comissão sobre o RCLE da UE permanece intacta. Ou seja, haverá um limite máximo da UE sobre o número de licenças de emissão e este limite diminuirá anualmente ao longo de uma linha de tendência linear, que continuará para além do final do terceiro período de negociação (2018-2020). A principal diferença, em comparação com a proposta, é que o leilão de licenças será gradualmente mais lento.

Quais são as principais mudanças em relação à proposta da Comissão?

Em resumo, as principais mudanças que foram feitas na proposta são as seguintes:

Alguns Estados-Membros podem beneficiar de uma derrogação facultativa e temporária da regra segundo a qual as licenças de emissão devem ser atribuídas gratuitamente aos geradores de electricidade a partir de 2018. Esta opção de derrogação está disponível para os Estados-Membros que cumpram certas condições relacionadas com a interconectividade de sua eletricidade grade, participação de um único combustível fóssil na produção de eletricidade e PIB / habitação em relação à média da UE-27. Além disso, a quantidade de licenças gratuitas que um Estado-Membro pode atribuir a usinas de energia é limitada a 70% das emissões de dióxido de carbono das plantas relevantes na fase 1 e diminui nos anos subseqüentes. Além disso, a alocação gratuita na fase 3 só pode ser dada às usinas que estejam operacionais ou em construção até o final de 2008. Veja a resposta à pergunta 15 abaixo. Haverá mais detalhes na directiva sobre os critérios a serem utilizados para determinar os setores ou subsectores considerados expostos a um risco significativo de vazamento de carbono e uma data anterior à publicação da lista da Comissão desses setores (31 de dezembro 2009). Além disso, sujeito a revisão quando um acordo internacional satisfatório for alcançado, as instalações em todas as indústrias expostas receberão 100% de licenças gratuitas na medida em que usem a tecnologia mais eficiente. A alocação gratuita para a indústria é limitada à participação das emissões dessas emissões nas emissões totais em 2005 a 2007. O número total de licenças atribuídas gratuitamente às instalações nos setores da indústria diminuirá anualmente de acordo com o declínio do limite de emissões. Os Estados-Membros podem também compensar certas instalações para os custos de CO 2 repercutidos nos preços da electricidade se os custos de CO 2 puderem, de outro modo, expô-los ao risco de vazamento de carbono. A Comissão comprometeu-se a modificar as orientações comunitárias relativas aos auxílios estatais a favor do ambiente a este respeito. Veja a resposta à pergunta 15 abaixo. O nível de leilão de licenças para a indústria não exposta aumentará de forma linear, conforme proposto pela Comissão, mas, em vez de atingir 100% até 2020, atingirá 70%, com vista a atingir 100% até 2027. Conforme previsto em Na proposta da Comissão, 10% das licenças para leilão serão redistribuídas de Estados-Membros com elevado rendimento per capita para pessoas com baixo rendimento per capita, a fim de reforçar a capacidade financeira destes últimos para investir em tecnologias amigáveis ​​com o clima. Foi adicionada uma provisão para outro mecanismo redistributivo de 2% das licenças de leilão para levar em consideração os Estados-Membros que em 2005 alcançaram uma redução de pelo menos 20% nas emissões de gases de efeito estufa em relação ao ano de referência estabelecido pelo Protocolo de Quioto. A participação das receitas de leilão que os Estados-Membros recomendam utilizar para combater e adaptar-se às alterações climáticas, principalmente na UE, mas também nos países em desenvolvimento, é aumentada de 20% para 50%. O texto fornece um complemento para o nível de uso permitido proposto de créditos JI / CDM no cenário de 20% para os operadores existentes que receberam os orçamentos mais baixos para importar e usar esses créditos em relação às alocações e acesso aos créditos no período 2008-2018. Novos setores, novos participantes nos períodos 2018-2020 e 2008-2018 também poderão usar créditos. O montante total de créditos que podem ser utilizados não excederá, no entanto, 50% da redução entre 2008 e 2020. Com base em uma redução mais rigorosa das emissões no contexto de um acordo internacional satisfatório, a Comissão poderia permitir o acesso adicional às RCE e UREs para os operadores do regime comunitário. Veja a resposta à pergunta 20 abaixo. O produto do leilão de 300 milhões de licenças da reserva dos novos participantes será utilizado para apoiar até 12 projetos e projetos de demonstração de captura e armazenamento de carbono que demonstram tecnologias inovadoras de energia renovável. Uma série de condições são anexadas a este mecanismo de financiamento. Veja a resposta à pergunta 30 abaixo. A possibilidade de excluir as pequenas instalações de combustão, desde que estejam sujeitas a medidas equivalentes, tenha sido ampliada para cobrir todas as pequenas instalações, independentemente da atividade, o limite de emissão foi aumentado de 10.000 para 25.000 toneladas de CO 2 por ano e o limite de capacidade que As instalações de combustão devem ser cumpridas, além disso, foram aumentadas de 25MW para 35MW. Com esses limiares aumentados, a participação das emissões cobertas que poderiam ser excluídas do sistema de comércio de emissões torna-se significativa e, consequentemente, uma provisão foi adicionada para permitir uma redução correspondente do limite máximo da UE em subsídios.

Ainda haverá planos nacionais de alocação (NAPs)?

Não. Nos seus PAN para os primeiros períodos de negociação (2005-2007) e segundo (2008-2018), os Estados-Membros determinaram a quantidade total de licenças de emissão a serem emitidas - o limite - e como estas seriam alocadas às instalações em questão. Esta abordagem gerou diferenças significativas nas regras de alocação, criando um incentivo para cada Estado-Membro favorecer sua própria indústria e gerou uma grande complexidade.

A partir do terceiro período de negociação, haverá um único limite para a UE e as licenças serão alocadas com base em regras harmonizadas. Os planos de alocação nacionais não serão mais necessários.

Como o limite de emissão na fase 3 será determinado?

As regras para o cálculo do limite da UE são as seguintes:

A partir de 2018, o número total de licenças diminuirá anualmente de forma linear. O ponto de partida desta linha é a quantidade total média de subsídios (limite de fase 2) a ser emitido pelos Estados Membros para o período 2008-12, ajustado para refletir o alcance ampliado do sistema a partir de 2018, bem como quaisquer pequenas instalações que o Membro Os Estados escolheram excluir. O fator linear pelo qual o montante anual deve diminuir é de 1,74% em relação ao limite da fase 2.

O ponto de partida para determinar o fator linear de 1,74% é a redução global de 20% dos gases com efeito de estufa em relação a 1990, o que equivale a uma redução de 14% em relação a 2005. No entanto, é necessária uma redução maior do ETS da UE porque é mais barato para reduzir as emissões nos setores ETS. A divisão que minimiza o custo total de redução equivale a:

uma redução de 21% nas emissões do sector ETS da UE em comparação com 2005 até 2020; uma redução de cerca de 10% em relação a 2005 para os sectores que não são abrangidos pelo RCLE da UE.

A redução de 21% em 2020 resulta em um limite de ETS em 2020 de um máximo de 1720 milhões de subsídios e implica um limite médio de fase 3 (2018 a 2020) de cerca de 1846 milhões de licenças e uma redução de 11% em relação ao limite de fase 2.

Todos os valores absolutos indicados correspondem à cobertura no início do segundo período de negociação e, portanto, não levam em conta a aviação, que será adicionada em 2018 e outros setores que serão adicionados na fase 3.

Os valores finais dos limites anuais de emissão na fase 3 serão determinados e publicados pela Comissão até 30 de setembro de 2018.

Como o limite de emissão para além da fase 3 será determinado?

O fator linear de 1,74% usado para determinar o limite da fase 3 continuará a ser aplicado além do final do período de negociação em 2020 e determinará o limite para o quarto período de negociação (2021 a 2028) e além. Pode ser revisto até 2025, o mais tardar. De fato, as reduções significativas de emissões de 60% a 80% em relação a 1990 serão necessárias até 2050 para atingir o objetivo estratégico de limitar o aumento da temperatura média global para não mais de 2 ° C acima dos níveis pré-industriais.

Será estabelecido um limite máximo de licenças de emissão a nível da UE para cada ano. Isso reduziria a flexibilidade para as instalações em questão?

Não, a flexibilidade para as instalações não será reduzida. Em qualquer ano, os subsídios a serem leilados e distribuídos devem ser emitidos pelas autoridades competentes até 28 de fevereiro. A última data para os operadores renderem subsídios é 30 de abril do ano seguinte ao ano em que as emissões ocorreram. Assim, os operadores recebem subsídios para o ano em curso antes de terem que entregar subsídios para cobrir suas emissões para o ano anterior. Os subsídios permanecem válidos durante todo o período de negociação e quaisquer subsídios excedentes agora podem ser "depositados" para uso em períodos de negociação subsequentes. A este respeito, nada mudará.

O sistema permanecerá com base nos períodos de negociação, mas o terceiro período de negociação durará oito anos, de 2018 a 2020, em oposição a cinco anos para a segunda fase de 2008 a 2018.

Para o segundo período de negociação, os Estados-Membros geralmente decidiram atribuir quantidades iguais iguais de subsídios para cada ano. A diminuição linear de cada ano a partir de 2018 corresponderá melhor às tendências de emissões esperadas ao longo do período.

Quais são os números preliminares preliminares do ETS para o período de 2018 a 2020?

Os valores iniciais preliminares são os seguintes:

Estes valores baseiam-se no âmbito do RCLE aplicável na fase 2 (2008 a 2018) e as decisões da Comissão sobre os planos nacionais de atribuição para a fase 2, no montante de 2083 milhões de toneladas. Estes números serão ajustados por vários motivos. Em primeiro lugar, será feito o ajuste para levar em consideração as extensões do escopo na fase 2, desde que os Estados Membros comprovem e verifiquem suas emissões resultantes dessas extensões. Em segundo lugar, o ajuste será feito com relação a extensões adicionais do escopo do ETS no terceiro período de negociação. Em terceiro lugar, qualquer opt-out de pequenas instalações levará a uma redução correspondente do limite. Em quarto lugar, os números não levam em conta a inclusão da aviação, nem as emissões da Noruega, da Islândia e do Liechtenstein.

Os subsídios ainda serão alocados gratuitamente?

Sim. As instalações industriais receberão alocação livre de transição. E, nos Estados-Membros elegíveis para a derrogação facultativa, as centrais eléctricas podem, se o Estado-Membro assim o decidir, também receberem licenças gratuitas. Estima-se que pelo menos metade dos subsídios disponíveis a partir de 2018 serão leiloados.

Embora a grande maioria das licenças de emissão tenha sido atribuída gratuitamente às instalações no primeiro e segundo períodos de negociação, a Comissão propôs que o leilão de licenças de emissão se tornasse o princípio básico para a alocação. Isso porque o leilão melhor garante a eficiência, transparência e simplicidade do sistema e cria o maior incentivo para investimentos em uma economia de baixo carbono. É melhor cumprir com o princípio do "poluidor-pagador" e evita dar lucros inesperados a certos setores que passaram o custo nocional de subsídios para seus clientes, apesar de recebê-los gratuitamente.

Como as permissões serão entregues de graça?

Até 31 de dezembro de 2018, a Comissão adotará regras a nível da UE, que serão desenvolvidas no âmbito de um procedimento de comitê ("Comitologia"). Essas regras harmonizarão completamente as dotações e, portanto, todas as empresas em toda a UE com as mesmas atividades ou atividades similares estarão sujeitas às mesmas regras. As regras garantirão, na medida do possível, que a alocação promova tecnologias eficientes em carbono. As regras adotadas estabelecem que, na medida do possível, as alocações devem basear-se nos chamados benchmarks, p. Ex. a number of allowances per quantity of historical output. Such rules reward operators that have taken early action to reduce greenhouse gases, better reflect the polluter pays principle and give stronger incentives to reduce emissions, as allocations would no longer depend on historical emissions. All allocations are to be determined before the start of the third trading period and no ex-post adjustments will be allowed.

Which installations will receive free allocations and which will not? How will negative impacts on competitiveness be avoided?

Taking into account their ability to pass on the increased cost of emission allowances, full auctioning is the rule from 2018 onwards for electricity generators. However, Member States who fulfil certain conditions relating to their interconnectivity or their share of fossil fuels in electricity production and GDP per capita in relation to the EU-27 average, have the option to temporarily deviate from this rule with respect to existing power plants. The auctioning rate in 2018 is to be at least 30% in relation to emissions in the first period and has to increase progressively to 100% no later than 2020. If the option is applied, the Member State has to undertake to invest in improving and upgrading of the infrastructure, in clean technologies and in diversification of their energy mix and sources of supply for an amount to the extent possible equal to the market value of the free allocation.

In other sectors, allocations for free will be phased out progressively from 2018, with Member States agreeing to start at 20% auctioning in 2018, increasing to 70% auctioning in 2020 with a view to reaching 100% in 2027. However, an exception will be made for installations in sectors that are found to be exposed to a significant risk of 'carbon leakage'. This risk could occur if the EU ETS increased production costs so much that companies decided to relocate production to areas outside the EU that are not subject to comparable emission constraints. The Commission will determine the sectors concerned by 31 December 2009. To do this, the Commission will assess inter alia whether the direct and indirect additional production costs induced by the implementation of the ETS Directive as a proportion of gross value added exceed 5% and whether the total value of its exports and imports divided by the total value of its turnover and imports exceeds 10%. If the result for either of these criteria exceeds 30%, the sector would also be considered to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. Installations in these sectors would receive 100% of their share in the annually declining total quantity of allowances for free. The share of these industries' emissions is determined in relation to total ETS emissions in 2005 to 2007.

CO 2 costs passed on in electricity prices could also expose certain installations to the risk of carbon leakage. In order to avoid such risk, Member States may grant a compensation with respect to such costs. In the absence of an international agreement on climate change, the Commission has undertaken to modify the Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection in this respect.

Under an international agreement which ensures that competitors in other parts of the world bear a comparable cost, the risk of carbon leakage may well be negligible. Therefore, by 30 June 2018, the Commission will carry out an in-depth assessment of the situation of energy-intensive industry and the risk of carbon leakage, in the light of the outcome of the international negotiations and also taking into account any binding sectoral agreements that may have been concluded. The report will be accompanied by any proposals considered appropriate. These could potentially include maintaining or adjusting the proportion of allowances received free of charge to industrial installations that are particularly exposed to global competition or including importers of the products concerned in the ETS.

Who will organise the auctions and how will they be carried out?

Member States will be responsible for ensuring that the allowances given to them are auctioned. Each Member State has to decide whether it wants to develop its own auctioning infrastructure and platform or whether it wants to cooperate with other Member States to develop regional or EU-wide solutions. The distribution of the auctioning rights to Member States is largely based on emissions in phase 1 of the EU ETS, but a part of the rights will be redistributed from richer Member States to poorer ones to take account of the lower GDP per head and higher prospects for growth and emissions among the latter. It is still the case that 10% of the rights to auction allowances will be redistributed from Member States with high per capita income to those with low per capita income in order to strengthen the financial capacity of the latter to invest in climate friendly technologies. However, a provision has been added for another redistributive mechanism of 2% to take into account Member States which in 2005 had achieved a reduction of at least 20% in greenhouse gas emissions compared with the reference year set by the Kyoto Protocol. Nine Member States benefit from this provision.

Any auctioning must respect the rules of the internal market and must therefore be open to any potential buyer under non-discriminatory conditions. By 30 June 2018, the Commission will adopt a Regulation (through the comitology procedure) that will provide the appropriate rules and conditions for ensuring efficient, coordinated auctions without disturbing the allowance market.

How many allowances will each Member State auction and how is this amount determined?

All allowances which are not allocated free of charge will be auctioned. A total of 88% of allowances to be auctioned by each Member State is distributed on the basis of the Member State's share of historic emissions under the EU ETS. For purposes of solidarity and growth, 12% of the total quantity is distributed in a way that takes into account GDP per capita and the achievements under the Kyoto-Protocol.

Which sectors and gases are covered as of 2018?

The ETS covers installations performing specified activities. Since the start it has covered, above certain capacity thresholds, power stations and other combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board. As for greenhouse gases, it currently only covers carbon dioxide emissions, with the exception of the Netherlands, which has opted in emissions from nitrous oxide.

As from 2018, the scope of the ETS will be extended to also include other sectors and greenhouse gases. CO 2 emissions from petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium will be included, as will N2O emissions from the production of nitric, adipic and glyocalic acid production and perfluorocarbons from the aluminium sector. The capture, transport and geological storage of all greenhouse gas emissions will also be covered. These sectors will receive allowances free of charge according to EU-wide rules, in the same way as other industrial sectors already covered.

As of 2018, aviation will also be included in the EU ETS.

Will small installations be excluded from the scope?

A large number of installations emitting relatively low amounts of CO 2 are currently covered by the ETS and concerns have been raised over the cost-effectiveness of their inclusion. As from 2018, Member States will be allowed to remove these installations from the ETS under certain conditions. The installations concerned are those whose reported emissions were lower than 25 000 tonnes of CO 2 equivalent in each of the 3 years preceding the year of application. For combustion installations, an additional capacity threshold of 35MW applies. In addition Member States are given the possibility to exclude installations operated by hospitals. The installations may be excluded from the ETS only if they will be covered by measures that will achieve an equivalent contribution to emission reductions.

How many emission credits from third countries will be allowed?

For the second trading period, Member States allowed their operators to use significant quantities of credits generated by emission-saving projects undertaken in third countries to cover part of their emissions in the same way as they use ETS allowances. The revised Directive extends the rights to use these credits for the third trading period and allows a limited additional quantity to be used in such a way that the overall use of credits is limited to 50% of the EU-wide reductions over the period 2008-2020. For existing installations, and excluding new sectors within the scope, this will represent a total level of access of approximately 1.6 billion credits over the period 2008-2020. In practice, this means that existing operators will be able to use credits up to a minimum of 11% of their allocation during the period 2008-2018, while a top-up is foreseen for operators with the lowest sum of free allocation and allowed use of credits in the 2008-2018 period. New sectors and new entrants in the third trading period will have a guaranteed minimum access of 4.5% of their verified emissions during the period 2018-2020. For the aviation sector, the minimum access will be 1.5%. The precise percentages will be determined through comitology.

These projects must be officially recognised under the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism (covering projects carried out in countries with an emissions reduction target under the Protocol) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (for projects undertaken in developing countries). Credits from JI projects are known as Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) while those from CDM projects are called Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).

On the quality side only credits from project types eligible for use in the EU trading scheme during the period 2008-2018 will be accepted in the period 2018-2020. Furthermore, from 1 January 2018 measures may be applied to restrict the use of specific credits from project types. Such a quality control mechanism is needed to assure the environmental and economic integrity of future project types.

To create greater flexibility, and in the absence of an international agreement being concluded by 31 December 2009, credits could be used in accordance with agreements concluded with third countries. The use of these credits should however not increase the overall number beyond 50% of the required reductions. Such agreements would not be required for new projects that started from 2018 onwards in Least Developed Countries.

Based on a stricter emissions reduction in the context of a satisfactory international agreement , additional access to credits could be allowed, as well as the use of additional types of project credits or other mechanisms created under the international agreement. However, once an international agreement has been reached, from January 2018 onwards only credits from projects in third countries that have ratified the agreement or from additional types of project approved by the Commission will be eligible for use in the Community scheme.

Will it be possible to use credits from carbon ‘sinks’ like forests?

No. Before making its proposal, the Commission analysed the possibility of allowing credits from certain types of land use, land-use change and forestry (‘LULUCF’) projects which absorb carbon from the atmosphere. It concluded that doing so could undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS, for the following reasons:

LULUCF projects cannot physically deliver permanent emissions reductions. Insufficient solutions have been developed to deal with the uncertainties, non-permanence of carbon storage and potential emissions 'leakage' problems arising from such projects. The temporary and reversible nature of such activities would pose considerable risks in a company-based trading system and impose great liability risks on Member States. The inclusion of LULUCF projects in the ETS would require a quality of monitoring and reporting comparable to the monitoring and reporting of emissions from installations currently covered by the system. This is not available at present and is likely to incur costs which would substantially reduce the attractiveness of including such projects. The simplicity, transparency and predictability of the ETS would be considerably reduced. Moreover, the sheer quantity of potential credits entering the system could undermine the functioning of the carbon market unless their role were limited, in which case their potential benefits would become marginal.

The Commission, the Council and the European Parliament believe that global deforestation can be better addressed through other instruments. For example, using part of the proceeds from auctioning allowances in the EU ETS could generate additional means to invest in LULUCF activities both inside and outside the EU, and may provide a model for future expansion. In this respect the Commission has proposed to set up the Global Forest Carbon Mechanism that would be a performance-based system for financing reductions in deforestation levels in developing countries.

Besides those already mentioned, are there other credits that could be used in the revised ETS?

Sim. Projects in EU Member States which reduce greenhouse gas emissions not covered by the ETS could issue credits. These Community projects would need to be managed according to common EU provisions set up by the Commission in order to be tradable throughout the system. Such provisions would be adopted only for projects that cannot be realised through inclusion in the ETS. The provisions will seek to ensure that credits from Community projects do not result in double-counting of emission reductions nor impede other policy measures to reduce emissions not covered by the ETS, and that they are based on simple, easily administered rules.

Are there measures in place to ensure that the price of allowances won't fall sharply during the third trading period?

A stable and predictable regulatory framework is vital for market stability. The revised Directive makes the regulatory framework as predictable as possible in order to boost stability and rule out policy-induced volatility. Important elements in this respect are the determination of the cap on emissions in the Directive well in advance of the start of the trading period, a linear reduction factor for the cap on emissions which continues to apply also beyond 2020 and the extension of the trading period from 5 to 8 years. The sharp fall in the allowance price during the first trading period was due to over-allocation of allowances which could not be “banked” for use in the second trading period. For the second and subsequent trading periods, Member States are obliged to allow the banking of allowances from one period to the next and therefore the end of one trading period is not expected to have any impact on the price.

A new provision will apply as of 2018 in case of excessive price fluctuations in the allowance market. If, for more than six consecutive months, the allowance price is more than three times the average price of allowances during the two preceding years on the European market, the Commission will convene a meeting with Member States. If it is found that the price evolution does not correspond to market fundamentals, the Commission may either allow Member States to bring forward the auctioning of a part of the quantity to be auctioned, or allow them to auction up to 25% of the remaining allowances in the new entrant reserve.

The price of allowances is determined by supply and demand and reflects fundamental factors like economic growth, fuel prices, rainfall and wind (availability of renewable energy) and temperature (demand for heating and cooling) etc. A degree of uncertainty is inevitable for such factors. The markets, however, allow participants to hedge the risks that may result from changes in allowances prices.

Are there any provisions for linking the EU ETS to other emissions trading systems?

Sim. One of the key means to reduce emissions more cost-effectively is to enhance and further develop the global carbon market. The Commission sees the EU ETS as an important building block for the development of a global network of emission trading systems. Linking other national or regional cap-and-trade emissions trading systems to the EU ETS can create a bigger market, potentially lowering the aggregate cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The increased liquidity and reduced price volatility that this would entail would improve the functioning of markets for emission allowances. This may lead to a global network of trading systems in which participants, including legal entities, can buy emission allowances to fulfil their respective reduction commitments.

The EU is keen to work with the new US Administration to build a transatlantic and indeed global carbon market to act as the motor of a concerted international push to combat climate change.

While the original Directive allows for linking the EU ETS with other industrialised countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the new rules allow for linking with any country or administrative entity (such as a state or group of states under a federal system) which has established a compatible mandatory cap-and-trade system whose design elements would not undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS. Where such systems cap absolute emissions, there would be mutual recognition of allowances issued by them and the EU ETS.

What is a Community registry and how does it work?

Registries are standardised electronic databases ensuring the accurate accounting of the issuance, holding, transfer and cancellation of emission allowances. As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol in its own right, the Community is also obliged to maintain a registry. This is the Community Registry, which is distinct from the registries of Member States. Allowances issued from 1 January 2018 onwards will be held in the Community registry instead of in national registries.

Will there be any changes to monitoring, reporting and verification requirements?

The Commission will adopt a new Regulation (through the comitology procedure) by 31 December 2018 governing the monitoring and reporting of emissions from the activities listed in Annex I of the Directive. A separate Regulation on the verification of emission reports and the accreditation of verifiers should specify conditions for accreditation, mutual recognition and cancellation of accreditation for verifiers, and for supervision and peer review as appropriate.

What provision will be made for new entrants into the market?

Five percent of the total quantity of allowances will be put into a reserve for new installations or airlines that enter the system after 2018 (“new entrants”). The allocations from this reserve should mirror the allocations to corresponding existing installations.

A part of the new entrant reserve, amounting to 300 million allowances, will be made available to support the investments in up to 12 demonstration projects using the carbon capture and storage technology and demonstration projects using innovative renewable energy technologies. There should be a fair geographical distribution of the projects.

In principle, any allowances remaining in the reserve shall be distributed to Member States for auctioning. The distribution key shall take into account the level to which installations in Member States have benefited from this reserve.

What has been agreed with respect to the financing of the 12 carbon capture and storage demonstration projects requested by a previous European Council?

The European Parliament's Environment Committee tabled an amendment to the EU ETS Directive requiring allowances in the new entrant reserve to be set aside in order to co-finance up to 12 demonstration projects as requested by the European Council in spring 2007. This amendment has later been extended to include also innovative renewable energy technologies that are not commercially viable yet. Projects shall be selected on the basis of objective and transparent criteria that include requirements for knowledge sharing. Support shall be given from the proceeds of these allowances via Member States and shall be complementary to substantial co-financing by the operator of the installation. No project shall receive support via this mechanism that exceeds 15% of the total number of allowances (i. e. 45 million allowances) available for this purpose. The Member State may choose to co-finance the project as well, but will in any case transfer the market value of the attributed allowances to the operator, who will not receive any allowances.

A total of 300 million allowances will therefore be set aside until 2018 for this purpose.

What is the role of an international agreement and its potential impact on EU ETS?

When an international agreement is reached, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council assessing the nature of the measures agreed upon in the international agreement and their implications, in particular with respect to the risk of carbon leakage. On the basis of this report, the Commission shall then adopt a legislative proposal amending the present Directive as appropriate.

For the effects on the use of credits from Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects, please see the reply to question 20.

Quais são os próximos passos?

Member States have to bring into force the legal instruments necessary to comply with certain provisions of the revised Directive by 31 December 2009. This concerns the collection of duly substantiated and verified emissions data from installations that will only be covered by the EU ETS as from 2018, and the national lists of installations and the allocation to each one. For the remaining provisions, the national laws, regulations and administrative provisions only have to be ready by 31 December 2018.

The Commission has already started the work on implementation. For example, the collection and analysis of data for use in relation to carbon leakage is ongoing (list of sectors due end 2009). Work is also ongoing to prepare the Regulation on timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning (due by June 2018), the harmonised allocation rules (due end 2018) and the two Regulations on monitoring and reporting of emissions and verification of emissions and accreditation of verifiers (due end 2018).

Support to the Review of the EU Emissions Trading System.

Ecologic Institute contributed key components of a comprehensive review of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) as part of a consortium of institutions who specialise in environmental policy. The review informs a stakeholder process for improving the EU ETS that is part of Europe's "climate and energy package 2030."

The review, which is split into specific chapters analysing and evaluating various aspects of the EU ETS, contributes to a new impact assessment on options for improving the EU ETS Directive. The outcome of the previous EU ETS review in 2008 (“the revised EU ETS Directive”) prepared the ground for the trading programme's third trading phase (2018-2020), which featured changes including an extended scope, the new centrally determined single EU cap, preferred allocation by auctioning, and improved registry rules. This study focuses mainly on the ETS Directive after those changes, in order to evaluate the situation before and after putting in place of the rules for 2018-2020. It is intended to inform further changes as part of a wider stakeholder process for improving the EU ETS, which is in turn part of the EU Commission's overall preparation of Europe's “climate and energy 2030 package.”

The specific areas of the review to which Ecologic contributed most thoroughly were auctioning, free allocation and carbon leakage, and the clean energy financing instrument known as the NER 300.

Ets trading system metastock download.

No Dealing Desk Spread Betting, CFD & Forex Trading - InterTraderInterTrader |.

Ets trading system metastock download unitedhealth group and untimely stock options.

Download32 is source for ets trading system for metastock shareware, freeware download MetaStock , EFX Forex Trading System.

ETS is a complete trading system with buy and sell entries, protective stops, trailing stops and profit. Find Best Metastock Trading System - Download. ETS Trading System. MetaStock compatibility:please review our add-on compatibility table to see which versions of MetaStock these add-ons work with.

The European Union Emissions Trading System: Ten Years and Counting.

A. Denny Ellerman, Claudio Marcantonini, Aleksandar Zaklan; The European Union Emissions Trading System: Ten Years and Counting, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy , Volume 10, Issue 1, 1 January 2018, Pages 89–107, https://doi/10.1093/reep/rev014.

Baixar arquivo de citações:

& # 169; 2018 Oxford University Press.

This article provides an introduction to the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS). First we describe the legislative development of the EU ETS, its evolution from free allocation to auctioning and centralized allocation rules, its relationship to the Kyoto Protocol and other trading systems, and its relationship to other EU climate and energy policies. This is followed by an assessment of the performance of the EU ETS, which focuses in particular on emissions, allowance prices, and the use of offsets. We conclude with a discussion of the current debate about the future of the EU ETS and proposals for changes to both the EU ETS and the climate policy environment in which it operates. ( JEL : Q54, Q58)

Introdução.

The European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the world’s largest cap-and-trade program and arguably the most important market-based application of economic principles to the climate problem. From its inception, the EU ETS has drawn attention and been the subject of vigorous debate in the public arena. In fact, in 2007, it was the topic of the symposium in the inaugural issue of this journal. The articles in that symposium discussed the unusually decentralized nature of the EU ETS ( Kruger, Oates, and Pizer 2007 ) and provided an initial assessment of its performance during its first two years ( Convery and Redmond 2007 ; Ellerman and Buchner 2007 ). In 2018, the EU ETS started its eleventh year, having completed its second phase (2008–2018) and begun its third phase (2018–2020) under an EU-wide cap on emissions that is declining indefinitely at an annual rate of 1.74 percent.

The objective of this journal’s second symposium on the EU ETS is to review and evaluate the literature on the EU ETS (as of 2018), to draw some conclusions about the performance of the EU ETS, and to suggest a research agenda to address unresolved issues. In this introductory article, we provide an overview of the EU ETS to serve as background for the topics discussed in the other two articles. In the first article, Hintermann, Peterson, and Rickels (2018) examine market and price behavior in the EU ETS. The second article, by Martin, Muûls, and Wagner (2018) , addresses the effect of the EU ETS on the behavior of regulated firms with respect to abatement, competitiveness, and innovation.

The remainder of this article consists of three sections. The first section describes the history and structure of the EU ETS. The second section reviews the performance of the EU ETS over its first ten years, focusing on emissions, allowance prices, and the use of offsets. 1 The final section discusses the continuing debate about the design of the EU ETS and the recently adopted and proposed changes to that design.

History and Structure of the EU ETS.

The EU ETS is a classic cap-and-trade system. 2 As of 2018, the EU ETS covered approximately 13,500 stationary installations in the electric utility and major industrial sectors and all domestic airline emissions in the EU’s twenty-eight member states, plus three members of the closely associated European Economic Area: Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. Approximately two billion tons of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and some other greenhouse gases (GHGs) are included in the system, together accounting for about 4 percent of global GHG emissions in 2018 ( Olivier et al. 2018 ). Aside from its sheer size in terms of geographic scope, number of included sources, and value of allowances, another distinguishing feature of the EU ETS is its implementation through a multinational framework, namely the EU, rather than through the action of a single state or national government, as assumed in most theory and as has been the case for most other cap-and-trade systems. 3 We turn now to the process by which this multinational system was adopted.

Legislative Development.

The first clear signal that the EU might implement an emissions trading system was in 2000, when the European Commission issued the Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading within the European Union ( European Commission 2000 ). This paper discussed whether the EU should implement an EU-wide cap-and-trade system to limit GHG emissions (initially CO 2 ) to complement other policies and measures, chiefly concerning energy efficiency and renewable energy, implemented primarily at the member-state level. Such a cap-and-trade system was also viewed as a means to ensure achievement of the targets to which the EU and its member states had committed in the Kyoto Protocol (KP). The green paper laid out the essential features of the system that would become the EU ETS: a trial period to run from 2005 through 2007, followed by full implementation over the 5-year period corresponding to the First Commitment Period of the KP (2008–2018). Following extensive debate, the ETS Directive was unanimously adopted by the European Council of Member States in October 2003 ( OJEU 2003 ). And, as initially proposed in the green paper, the EU ETS went into effect on January 1, 2005, 15 months later.

In October 2004, the ETS Directive was amended by the Linking Directive ( OJEU 2004 ), which allowed the owners of affected facilities to substitute a yet-to-be-specified number of offsets (i. e., credits from the KP’s Clean Development Mechanism [CDM] and Joint Implementation [JI]) to fulfill their obligation to submit EU allowances (EUAs) equal to their annual emissions.

In keeping with the spirit of an initial trial period, the ETS Directive called for the European Commission to review the first years of experience and to propose appropriate changes to the ETS. This review led to the adoption of significant revisions to the EU ETS in late 2008 ( OJEU 2009b ), which would govern the system from 2018 on. The most important changes in this Amended Directive were the following: The significance of the single EU-wide cap can only be appreciated by recognizing the considerable decentralization of cap-setting and allocation of allowances that existed under the initial ETS Directive.

adoption of a single EU-wide cap declining at 1.74 percent per annum;

adoption of auctioning as the basic allocation principle, to be fully applied to the electric utility sector in 2018 and to be phased in by 2027 for the remaining industrial sectors;

continued free allocation for industrial facilities according to centrally determined benchmarks during the transition to full auctioning; and.

changes in offset provisions that further limited their use while expanding the scope for linking with GHG cap-and-trade systems that might develop in other parts of the world. 4.

Evolution from a Highly Decentralized Structure to an EU-Wide Cap.

In its early years, the EU ETS can be best understood as a system for the mandatory linking of twenty-five member-state systems, each of which set its own cap and determined the distribution of allowances to affected facilities, subject to a 90-day review by the European Commission. More specifically, each member state developed a National Allocation Plan (NAP) stating the total number of allowances to be created and how they would be allocated to affected installations in the member state. These NAPs would go into effect unless the commission rejected the NAP because it failed to comply with certain criteria in the ETS Directive. In effect, the EU-wide cap was the sum of the member-state caps, and it would not be known definitively until the last NAP had been reviewed and not rejected. 5.

The NAP process proved to be long, laborious, and unrewarding for all concerned. In both the 2005–2007 and 2008–2018 periods, the commission rejected many NAP submissions, and several member states subsequently challenged these rulings before the European Court of First Instance. 6 It was not until 18 months into phase I that the last NAP cleared the commission’s review. The second NAP cycle started at this time, 18 months before the start of 2008, but member states were often late in submitting, and the final NAP to clear review without being rejected did so 1 month before the start of phase II. A year later, the member states agreed unanimously to abandon the NAP process and instead to adopt a system-wide cap to take effect in 2018. The single cap required a new set of principles for distributing allowances, which we explain next.

Auctioning and Centralized Allocation Rules.

The two greatest criticisms of the first phase were the “windfall profits” from free allocation and the alleged competitive distortions resulting from different member-state rules for allocation. Despite strong arguments in the European Parliament for significant auctioning of allowances, the directive finally agreed upon in 2003 required that at least 95 percent of allowances be allocated freely in the first phase and 90 percent in the second phase. In effect, decentralized free allocation was the political price for ensuring the participation of all member states in this multinational trading system. 7 Auctioning addressed both criticisms of the NAP process in one fell swoop. That is, windfall profits would be eliminated, as would the possibility of competitive distortions within the single EU market. However, auctioning would be phased in, which meant that EU-wide, sector-specific standards would have to be developed to avoid distortions from the remaining free allocation.

The timing by which auctioning would be introduced and free allocation phased out varied according to sector, perceived loss of competitiveness in international (non-EU) trade, and when the member state joined the EU. For example, free allocation ended abruptly in 2018 for the electric utility sector, which accounts for about 50 percent of EU ETS emissions ( Trotignon and Delbosc 2008 , p. 23) and was deemed not to face any competitive threat internationally. Some exceptions were allowed for coal-dependent new member states in Eastern Europe, which have more time to phase out free allocation, provided that they make investments in the modernization of the electricity sector.

The nonelectric industrial sectors, which face varying levels of non-EU competitive pressures, were allowed a more gradual phase out of free allocation beginning in 2018. Allocations to affected facilities were to follow EU-wide sector standards—called benchmarks—to be developed during phase II. For these industrial facilities, free allocation would start at 80 percent of the full benchmark in 2018, be reduced to 30 percent by 2020, and then phased out completely by 2027. In addition, if certain sectors continue to face competitive threats internationally, they will receive free allocations at the full benchmark level so long as the threat is determined to exist. The development of these sector-specific, EU-wide standards for free allocation was no small achievement.

Benchmarking.

Perhaps no concept had been more advocated and less practiced during the NAP process for the first and second trading periods than benchmarking ( Ellerman, Buchner, and Carraro 2007 ). The basic problem was the lack of agreement on a suitable benchmark, which, when combined with the rushed conditions under which the NAPs were developed, made it inevitable that the basis for allocation would be historical emissions. The Amended Directive resolved this issue by requiring the EU-wide benchmarks to be the average emission rate per unit of output for those installations in each ETS sector constituting the 10 percent with the lowest CO 2 emission rates in 2005. Although defining sectors was a challenge, benchmarks were established for some fifty sectors before the end of phase II. Finally, these benchmarks were subject to an initial 6 percent reduction to reconcile the resulting free allocations with the previously decided EU-wide cap and amounts to be auctioned, and they will decrease by the same annual 1.74 percent factor that now governs the whole EU ETS ( OJEU 2018a ). With benchmarking resolved, the only remaining issue was deciding what to do with the revenue from auctioning.

Revenues from allowance auctioning.

A long-standing fiscal rule for the EU made revenues from allowance auctioning a nonissue. Brussels is to have no independent sources of revenue other than as provided by the member states through the 7-year budgets. Accordingly, revenues from the allowance auctions will be distributed to member states as “auction rights” established by a formula that is inversely, but loosely, related to per capita income ( Ellerman 2018 ).

In less than 10 years, the EU ETS evolved from a trading system in which largely sovereign nations initially demanded and received considerable discretion in cap-setting and allocation to one in which those decisions are system-wide, although still negotiated among the participating member states. In the end, national caps mean little in a system with full trading, and arguably what matters most to the participating governments is the equitable distribution among themselves of the value created by the constraint on emissions. The experience of the EU ETS shows that, although free allocation may be needed to gain initial buy-in of participating nations and their affected facilities, the initial allocation to the private sector of the value created by the cap is not forever and can be remarkably brief.

Thus far, we have discussed the EU ETS as if it were a stand-alone system without relation to international agreements or trading with other GHG systems. However, it is embedded in an international framework, and the international aspects of the EU ETS are a source of continuing change.

The Relationship to the KP and Linkage.

The EU ETS was proposed and justified as a means for the EU and its member states to meet their Kyoto obligations, but implementation was not made contingent on the KP entering into force, despite the considerable uncertainty surrounding that issue when the initial ETS Directive was adopted in 2003. Moreover, implementation of the EU ETS beyond 2018 (when Kyoto obligations ended) does not depend on other international agreements, although its implementation is often justified on the basis of the EU’s contribution to such agreements.

The EU’s evolution toward independent action can also be observed in the provisions for linkage, a generic term that refers to both the acceptance of international credits and mutual recognition with other cap-and-trade systems. Reliance on an international agreement is explicit in the Linking Directive’s effective delegation of the certifying authority for determining acceptable international offsets to the KP’s CDM and JI crediting procedures. Nevertheless, the EU retained its prerogative (as a buyer of credits) to impose a system-wide quantitative limit on their use and to prohibit the use of credits from certain types of projects, such as large hydro installations and nuclear-generating plants. Subsequently, the Amended Directive of 2009 stated that credits from new projects (those certified after 2018) would not be accepted absent a post-2018 international agreement to which the EU and the host country adhered or a bilateral agreement between the two. Moreover, credit use within phase III (2018–2020) was limited to about 300 additional credits beyond the 1.3 billion limit imposed in phase II. 8 Finally, the European Commission unilaterally announced in 2018 that CDM credits generated by industrial gas projects with high global-warming potential would not be accepted for compliance beyond 2018 under any circumstances ( OJEU 2018 ).

These tightened restrictions on credit use were coupled with provisions that make mutual recognition (unrestricted trading between two systems) easier. Whereas the 2003 ETS Directive limited mutual recognition to parties to the KP (i. e., national systems), the Amended Directive dropped all mention of the KP (or any international agreement), thereby clearing the way for bilateral agreements. In addition, it explicitly mentions potential linkage to subnational systems, as long as they have an absolute cap.

To date, there are two examples of mutual recognition, one with Australia, announced and subsequently abandoned, and the other under negotiation with Switzerland. 9 The distinguishing feature of these two examples of potential linkage by mutual recognition is that they are bilateral—that is, negotiated between the parties directly and not as part of a larger international agreement. The EU is also watching developments in the South Korean system and the pilot or national systems in China with an eye to eventual linkage.

These developments in restricting the use of project credits and opening up the potential for mutual recognition with other cap-and-trade systems reflect not only the willingness of the EU to act independently of international agreement but also an unstated policy of “graduating” countries that demonstrate the ability to generate project credits to full-fledged cap-and-trade programs that can be linked to the EU ETS, thereby forming the basis for an eventual global system of GHG emissions trading.

Before leaving the historical and contextual background of the EU ETS, we turn to the relationship of the ETS to other climate and energy policies in the EU.

Relationship to Other EU and Member-State Climate and Energy Policies.

Although the EU ETS has been heralded as the centerpiece of the EU’s climate policy, it is not the EU’s only climate policy instrument. In fact, the slogan for the EU’s present comprehensive climate policy is “20-20-20 by 2020,” which refers to the three targets to be achieved by 2020: a 20 percent reduction of GHG emissions from 1990 levels, a 20 percent share of total energy consumption from renewable energy, and a 20 percent improvement in energy efficiency. While the 20-20-20 slogan suggests that equal weight is being placed on achieving each of the three goals, their legal statuses vary. The GHG emissions-reduction and renewable energy–share targets are binding, whereas the energy-efficiency target is effectively aspirational, with no sanctions for noncompliance. 10.

It is important to note that the measures adopted by member states to achieve the renewable-energy and energy-efficiency targets affect the 40 percent of EU GHG emissions that are covered by the EU ETS. In particular, several member states, notably Germany and Spain, have provided strong incentives to develop wind and solar energy capacity within the electricity sector, such that the generation of electricity from renewable sources in these member states has had a demonstrable effect on the generation of electricity from CO 2 - emitting, fossil fuel–generating plants. For instance, in 2018 electricity generation from wind and solar accounted for 24 percent and 16 percent of total generation in Spain and Germany, respectively (ENTSO-E 2018). What remains to be seen is whether the concomitant reductions in demand for allowances will have a large or small effect on allowance prices. 11.

EU-level climate policy is not the only potential source of overlap with the EU ETS. Member states can adopt their own energy or climate policies, which may also affect that member state’s ETS emissions and thus affect the EU ETS-wide allowance price and distribution of abatement. For example, following the Fukushima accident in March 2018, the German government accelerated its policy to phase-out nuclear power by immediately shutting down eight reactors and directing the others to close down by 2022. Although one can debate how much zero-emission renewable energy can substitute for nuclear generation during and after the nuclear phase-out, the nuclear phase-out is likely to cause some increased reliance on fossil generation, both natural gas and coal-fired, and thus an increase in the demand for allowances and an increase in the EUA price.

In contrast, the UK’s carbon price floor is likely to have the opposite effect. In order to encourage investment in low-carbon generating capacity, the United Kingdom imposed a tax on fossil-fuel supplies to electricity-generating facilities in April 2018. Known as a carbon price support, the tax is supplementary to the EUA price and set at a level that will yield a carbon price of £16/ton CO 2 in 2018 and £30/ton CO 2 in 2020 (approximately €19/ton and €35/ton) when the EUA price and the UK price support will be combined. Given the current EUA price of around €8/ton, this measure imposes a significantly higher carbon cost on fossil-fuel electricity-generating facilities in the UK than in other EU member states. Thus, the UK carbon price floor can be expected to reduce coal and natural gas generation in the United Kingdom and hence the demand for allowances. As is the case for the other examples of overlapping policies, the direction of the effect on the EUA price is clear, but the magnitude is not.

Performance of the EU ETS.

With this background on the initial design, development, and implementation of the EU ETS, we now turn to a discussion of its performance through the end of phase II and into the first years of phase III.

Emission Reductions.

The first and most important measure of performance for any cap-and-trade system is emissions: that is, are emissions being reduced? Answering this question requires that we look at some of the determinants of CO 2 emissions, among which the level of economic activity is perhaps the most important.

Recent trends in emissions and economic activity.

Figure 1 compares the evolution of EU ETS emissions between 2004 and 2018 with the evolution of two measures of economic output: real gross domestic product (GDP) for the twenty-five EU member states that were initially part of the EU ETS (EU25) and the industrial component of real GDP—gross value added (GVA). GVA includes electricity generation and most closely approximates the underlying economic activity of the sectors included in the EU ETS. All three indices are normalized to the year 2004, the year preceding the start of the EU ETS.

Evolution of EU ETS emissions and economic output, 2004–2018.

Evolution of EU ETS emissions and economic output, 2004–2018.

As can be readily seen, the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing recession had a noticeable effect on levels of economic activity and CO 2 emissions. And indeed the reduction of GVA in the industrial sector surely accounts for most of the reduction in ETS emissions observed between 2007 and 2009. However, since the low points in 2009, EU25 GDP has returned to its earlier level, and the corresponding GVA has recovered to within 5 percent of its earlier peak. CO 2 emissions have followed a different path. There was a 3.3 percent rebound in 2018 (compared with a 7.7 percent gain in industrial output), but since then, CO 2 emissions have continued to decline, and since 2018 have been lower than in 2009 despite the recovery in economic activity. Over the 10-year period (2004–2018), GDP and industrial output have increased at average annual rates of 0.92 percent and 0.55 percent, respectively, whereas CO 2 emissions have declined by an average annual rate of 2.1 percent. The ratio of ETS emissions to GDP has declined at an average rate of 3.0 percent, compared with a rate of decline of about 1 percent between 2000 and 2004 ( Ellerman, Convery, and de Perthuis 2018 , p. 164). These data suggest that there has been some decoupling of emissions and economic activity in recent years.

It is important to clarify that the line for emissions in figure 1 indicates CO 2 emissions from those installations participating in the ETS in 2005 and 2006. It does not account for the addition of new countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein) and sectors (aviation, chemicals, aluminum, and some non-CO 2 GHGs) since 2006. Over the years, these additions have expanded the coverage of the EU ETS by about 10 percent.

Another caveat is that other policy measures and the long-term trend toward increased energy efficiency have contributed to the reduction in CO 2 emissions within the EU ETS. As emphasized by Martin, Muûls, and Wagner (2018) , sorting out the effects of the CO 2 price from other factors is no easy task. Nevertheless, ETS emissions fell by 20 percent over the past 10 years, notwithstanding the recovered, albeit barely growing, levels of economic activity.

The long-term outlook.

Whatever the contribution of the EU ETS to the reduction in emissions shown in figure 1 , there can be no doubt about the future trend of emissions in the EU ETS. The declining cap will force emissions continually lower over time. And, as can be seen in figure 2 , the emissions are on track to meet that declining cap.

Long-term perspective on EU ETS sector emissions and cap, 1990–2050.

Long-term perspective on EU ETS sector emissions and cap, 1990–2050.

As in figure 1 , the data in figure 2 exclude the increases in the coverage of the ETS since 2005. Figure 2 also shows the amount by which the cap was increased in phase II through offsets surrendered in each year and the much smaller amount by which offsets will increase the cap in phase III. The area between emissions and the cap plus offsets through 2018 shows the cumulative amount of allowances banked to date. These allowances will likely be used in later years as costs rise, so emissions may rise above the cap for some years. However, there can be no doubt that the long-term trend of EU ETS emissions is downward, even without considering the increased rate of decline of the cap from 2020 that the commission has recently proposed ( European Commission 2018 , 2018a ).

Allowance Prices.

As the most visible manifestation of a cap-and-trade system, allowance prices receive a great deal of attention and are often viewed as indicating how well the system is functioning. We next provide an overview of price trends, a discussion of the effect of banking on price behavior, and data on the volume of emissions trading.

Overview of price trends.

As illustrated by figure 3 , a highly visible price for EUAs has existed since the beginning of the EU ETS in 2005. 12 This figure shows the prices of the next December futures contracts, which have become the main trading instruments in the EU ETS. 13.

Next December EUA futures prices in phase I and phases II and III.

Next December EUA futures prices in phase I and phases II and III.

The EUA price has varied considerably over the first 10 years of the EU ETS, particularly in late 2006 and during 2007, when the prices of phase I and phase II allowances also diverged significantly and as it became clear that phase I and phase II constituted separate markets with differing degrees of expected scarcity. When the EU ETS first started, the price of EUAs was expected to be between €5 and €10, and the prices obtained in early 2005 reflected this expectation. Soon thereafter, the EUA price rose quickly, triggering a debate over the reasons for the unexpectedly high price. The debate lasted until late April 2006, at which time several member states reported their emissions for 2005, with all being lower than expected. In response, the price for both phase I and phase II allowances fell significantly: by 50 percent and 30 percent, respectively. During the summer of 2006, the phase I price held at around €15, but as autumn began and as it became increasingly clear that phase I emissions would be below the cap, the price for phase I EUAs fell to a few euro cents, while the price of phase II EUAs remained generally between €15 and €20. As phase II began, the phase II price reached almost €30 before it fell again by about 50 percent as a result of the economic crisis of late 2008. This time, however, the price drop was not specific to the EU ETS; many other asset values (e. g., stocks, bonds, crude oil) experienced similar declines. After recovering somewhat in early 2009, the EUA price experienced a 2-year period of stability—with a price around €15—until the summer of 2018, when it fell again by around 50 percent, to a new low of €7–8 in 2018, before falling yet again, to around €4 as phase III began. Despite predictions by some observers that the price would again fall to zero, it did not, with €3.65 being the lowest price observed. In the 18 months since the all-time low at the beginning of 2018, the EUA price has risen steadily to more than twice the early 2018 low.

The influence of banking on allowance prices.

An examination of the price of EUAs at the end of phases I and II and the size of the allowance surplus accumulated in each phase highlights the importance of banking and its role in establishing a floor on prices. More specifically, the surplus was 83 million allowances at the end of phase I and 1.8 billion allowances at the end of phase II ( European Commission 2018b ), yet the price did not go to zero in 2018 as it did in 2007. This is because the phase I surplus allowances could not be carried over for use in phase II, whereas phase II allowances can be banked for use in phase III and later years when the cap will be even lower and prices are expected to be higher.

Trading of EUAs.

Initially, EUA trading was over-the-counter, as it had been for other cap-and-trade programs, such as the U. S. sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) Trading Program. However, organized exchanges started offering intermediary and hedging services shortly after the EU ETS began, and their share has grown steadily, accounting for as much as 80 percent of the trades in 2018, as shown in figure 4 .

Monthly volume of EUA trading.

Monthly volume of EUA trading.

Two trends are clear. First, the overall volume of trades involving EUAs has steadily increased over the life of the program. At the beginning, more than a year passed before trading exceeded 50 million allowances (or tons of emissions) a month. Over the next 5 years, trading volumes grew steadily to ten times that amount. The second trend is the already-noted shift in the location of trading (i. e., from over-the-counter to exchanges). While several exchanges offer intermediary and hedging services, such as Nordpool in Norway and EEX in Germany, the most important exchange has been the European Climate Exchange (ECX, now ICE) in London, which accounted for more than 90 percent of the exchange volume in 2018 ( Point Carbon 2018a ). Most of the transactions on these exchanges are for futures. Spot transactions have accounted for a small percentage of trades, and the leading exchange for spot transactions, BlueNext in Paris, closed at the end of 2018.

The EU ETS has conducted the world’s boldest experiment to date in the use of offsets. Most cap-and-trade systems (e. g., US SO 2 and nitrogen oxides trading, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, California CO 2 ) include provisions for offsets. However, such offsets are little (and often never) used because of the transaction costs of implementing monitoring, reporting, and verification procedures at off-system installations. The EU ETS broke new ground in two respects: it delegated offset certification authority to outside entities (i. e., those that already certify CDM and JI credits under the KP), and it imposed a quantitative limit on their use—approximately 11 percent of the phase II cap ( OJEU 2018b ). This experiment in offset use provides evidence on the use of offsets, their pricing relative to EUAs, and the origin of these substitute emission reductions, which we discuss next.

Offset issuance and use.

The EU ETS was not the sole market for CDM and JI credits; many were produced and bought by national governments throughout the world to satisfy obligations under the KP. However, the EU ETS was the largest single source of demand for these credits and the one with a relatively high price, thus providing considerable impetus for the creation of these credits. Table 1 presents data on the number of offsets submitted in lieu of EUAs to satisfy EU ETS compliance requirements through 2018 and the total number of these credits that were issued under the KP mechanisms (CDM and JI) in those years, including those used in the EU ETS.

Trends in numbers of EU ETS offsets surrendered and KP offsets issued.

Notes : Numbers are in millions. KP offset issuances correspond roughly to the compliance years of the ETS—that is, from May of the year indicated through April of the following year.

Several findings emerge from these data. First, half of the offsets issued under the KP through April 2018 were used for compliance in phase II of the ETS, reflecting the program’s status as the preferred, highest-return destination for these credits. Second, offset use started off very slowly, but it increased exponentially in the last three years of phase II, with half of the total offsets surrendered in 2018. Finally, the 1.3 billion phase II cap on offset use was not exceeded. Because unused entitlements to these credits (up to the phase II limit) can be converted to phase III allowances, the cumulative phase III cap will be higher by at least 240 million tons, and perhaps more, to the extent that credits from new projects are allowed within the additional 300 million limit for phase III.

Pricing of CERs versus EUAs.

Although the use of offsets (which were equal to about 10 percent of the phase II ETS cap) had some effect on the EUA price, the feature that has caught the most attention is the continual discount at which CERs (the primary source of credits until 2018) sold relative to EUAs despite being almost perfect substitutes for EUAs. 14 As shown in figure 5 , this discount ranged from 10 percent to 30 percent during the early years of phase II before increasing to 90 percent and higher in the final year of phase II.

EUA and CER pricing.

EUA and CER pricing.

It is clear from figure 5 that the CER price tracked the EUA price for most of phase II, albeit with a widening discount. However, since the beginning of 2018, that relationship appears to have ended. Contributing factors undoubtedly include the very limited acceptability of CERs in the EU ETS after 2018 and the absence of demand in the alternative Kyoto market. 15.

We next turn to an accounting of the types of projects undertaken to generate these offsets and the countries in which these projects were located.

Project categories and countries of origin.

The most notable feature of table 2 is the predominance of projects reducing non-CO 2 , high-global-warming-potential (GWP) greenhouse gases. Industrial gases (hydrofluorocarbon [HFC] and nitrogen dioxide [N 2 O]) have GWPs that are thousands of times higher than that of CO 2 (=1), whereas methane (CH 4 ) reductions have a value that is twenty times higher than that of CO 2 . This means that although the costs of reducing a ton of emissions from these non-CO 2 projects may be higher than those from CO 2 reductions, the evidence suggests that the size of the GWP, which determines how many credits are issued (with each credit equal to 1 ton of CO 2 - emission reduction), more than makes up for the cost difference.

Project categories for issued CERs and ERUs.

Notes: Numbers are in millions.

As shown in table 3 , the national origin of offset credits is also concentrated, with emerging economies, especially China, accounting for the bulk of the CERs issued and the Ukraine and Russia accounting for most of the ERUs issued. There is no overlap in the issuance of CERs and ERUs because ERUs could be issued only by nations listed in annex I of the KP (generally Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and former Soviet Union countries) and CERs could be issued only by countries that, unlike annex I signatories of the KP, were not obligated to limit GHG emissions. Although the “Others” category in table 3 includes many countries in both the CER and ERU categories, they constitute a small percentage of the totals.

Country of origin for issued CERs and ERUs.

Notes: Numbers are in millions.

Summary and Conclusions: Whither Phase III?

The great surprise of the second phase of the EU ETS was that, as phase III started in 2018, the price paid to emit carbon was less than €5, not the €30 or more that had been indicated by 2018 futures prices in 2008 and that was generally expected at that time. This development has created a lively debate about the future of the EU ETS and its role in climate policy. This debate can be summarized as being between those who view the current, much-lower-than-expected price as indicating serious flaws in the EU ETS and those who argue that the low price shows that the system is working exactly as it should given all that has happened since 2008 (i. e., reduced expectations for economic growth in the Eurozone, increased electricity generation from renewable sources, the significant use of offsets), including the possibility that abatement may be cheaper than initially expected. Fundamentally, this debate reflects differing views of the objectives of climate policy itself: whether the objective is solely to reduce GHG emissions or also (and perhaps principally) to transform the European energy system. Although no one is suggesting that emissions have exceeded the cap, or that they will do so, current prices do not seem likely to lead to the kind of technological transformation that would greatly reduce Europe’s reliance on fossil fuels. Since mid-2018, the debate about the future of the EU ETS has focused on three issues—back-loading, restructuring, and the 2030 targets.

Back-loading.

Back-loading refers to changing the scheduled quantities of auctioned allowances so that fewer are auctioned in the early years and more are auctioned in the later years of phase II. After some debate, the decision was made in February 2018 ( OJEU 2018 ) to withdraw 900 million allowances from auctioning in 2018–2018 and to add them back in to auctioning in 2019–2020. 16 The debate about back-loading was, however, not so much about the timing of auctioned quantities and its effect on EUA prices as it was a proxy for the more important issue of restructuring: whether to adopt more significant changes in the design of the EU ETS in order to provide a stronger incentive for low-carbon investment in Europe. Viewed from this perspective, back-loading was only a first step toward reducing the near-term quantity of allowances in order to provide time to build a consensus for taking tougher actions before the withdrawn allowances would be reinjected into the system.

Restructuring and Targets for 2030.

In November 2018, not long after the formal submission of the back-loading proposal, the commission published a report, State of the Carbon Market , in which six alternatives for “restructuring” the EU ETS were presented ( European Commission 2018 ): (1) increasing the EU reduction target to 30 percent in 2020, (2) retiring allowances in phase III, (3) early revision (downward) of the 1.74 percent annual reduction in the cap, (4) extending the scope of the ETS to other sectors, (5) limiting access to international credits, and (6) creating a discretionary price management mechanism.

This report was followed in March 2018 by a green paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies ( European Commission 2018 ), which raised questions for debate about not only the restructuring of the EU ETS but also the post-2020 targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency and the coordination of those targets with the EU ETS. The context for this debate is both the absence of any post-2020 targets for the renewable energy and energy efficiency components of the present 20-20-20 by 2020 policy and the inability of the 1.74 percent annual reduction factor to reduce GHG emissions to 80 percent below 1990 emissions by 2050, the level called for in the 2050 Roadmap ( European Commission 2018 ).

A More Specific Proposal for 2030.

In January 2018, the commission followed up on the green paper with a more specific proposal for a comprehensive policy framework for climate and energy for 2020 to 2030 ( 2018 ). This proposal was remarkably sparse in recommendations for specific actions: a commitment to reduce EU GHG emissions by 40 percent below the 1990 level by 2030, the adoption of a Market Stability Reserve for the EU ETS that would withdraw and inject allowances after 2020 according to a quantitative formula, and an increase in the annual reduction in the EU-wide ETS cap after 2020, from 1.74 percent to 2.2 percent. The first two actions were presented as actions to be adopted in 2018: the 40 percent target in order to signal the EU’s contribution to the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting in Paris in late 2018, and the Market Stability Reserve as a technical fix to stabilize EUA prices in the EU ETS. The tightening of the EU ETS cap, as well as other possible measures, was to be decided after the May 2018 elections and the appointment of a new commission in late 2018.

The most remarkable feature of the more specific 2030 proposal is the absence of targets for renewable energy and energy conservation. There is considerable discussion of accompanying policies, but it is general, without proposing the type of specific member-state targets that exist now. A renewable energy target of 27 percent by 2030 is proposed, but it is an EU-wide goal and explicitly not broken down into the member-state targets that would give it legal force. What emerges most clearly from this document is its focus on the ETS, without the accompanying ancillary policies at the EU level that characterize current policy.

Although consideration and adoption of the specific proposals for 2030 have been slower than originally expected, notable progress has still been made. The Ukrainian crisis bumped consideration of the 40 percent EU-wide GHG reduction goal for 2030 from the spring agenda, but it was taken up and approved in October 2018 ( European Council 2018 ). The proposal to establish the Market Stability Reserve could not be considered until the new commission was appointed, but it was quickly taken up and an amended version was approved by the European Parliament in July 2018 ( European Parliament 2018 ) and expected to receive final approval by the European Council later in 2018. This amended version moves the start of the Market Stability Reserve forward by two years, to 2019, in order to receive the 900 million “back-loaded” allowances. This means that these allowances will not be reinjected into the system in 2019–2020. Finally, in July 2018, the commission forwarded the formal legislative proposal to increase the rate of decline in the post-2020 cap from 1.74 percent to 2.2 percent ( European Commission 2018a ). Stakeholder consultations and debate in the European Parliament and among member states will now occur as this final concrete proposal from the 2030 package moves toward final adoption.

Concluding Comments.

As the broader debate about climate and energy policy continues, it is important to keep in mind what has been achieved by the EU ETS. Absent a decision by the EU to abandon the program, which would require a super-majority, the EU ETS will march on with a continually declining cap, which, under all likely scenarios, will create continuing scarcity, thus virtually guaranteeing that a carbon price will be a permanent feature of the European economic landscape. Although one could question whether the consensus exists to tighten the EU ETS cap, repeal of the EU ETS appears highly unlikely. Moreover, if the current consensus no longer supports enforceable member-state targets for renewable energy, as seems to be the case, the EU ETS will be the only EU climate instrument in force after 2020. Thus, the EU ETS appears to be here to stay, and this remarkable experiment in climate policy will no doubt continue to provide economists and policy makers with fertile ground for research and debate for many years to come.

Referências.

Alertas de E-mail.

Companion Articles.

Artigos relacionados em.

Citando artigos via.

Online ISSN 1750-6824 Imprimir ISSN 1750-6816 Copyright & # 169; 2018 Associação de Economistas Ambientais e de Recursos.

Recursos.

Oxford University Press é um departamento da Universidade de Oxford. Promove o objetivo da Universidade de excelência em pesquisas, bolsas e educação através da publicação em todo o mundo.

Direitos autorais e cópia; 2017 Oxford University Press Política de Privacidade Política de Cookies Avisos Legais Mapa do Site Acessibilidade Obter Adobe Reader.

Este recurso está disponível apenas para assinantes.

Este PDF está disponível apenas para Assinantes.

Para acesso total a este pdf, faça login em uma conta existente ou compre uma assinatura anual.